Optimal price adjustment: tests of a price equation in U.S. manufacturing by Von zur Muehlen, Peter
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Optimal price adjustment: tests of a
price equation in U.S. manufacturing
Peter Von zur Muehlen
Federal Reserve Board
13. December 1972
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44581/
MPRA Paper No. 44581, posted 25. February 2013 00:29 UTC
Conference
Librory of Congress Cotolog Cord Number: TJ2l7, ll7, 1972
Proceedings of the
r977
IEEE
Decisionon
and Conffol
and
1lth Sy*posium
on Adapdve Processes
December L3.L5
Fontainebleau Motor Hotel
New Orleans, Louisiana
Sponsored By IEEE Control System Society
Cooperatihg Organizations
IEEE Group On Information Theory.
IEEE Systems, Man, and Cybernetics Society
't
cDc
PAPER No.
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^The 
Kuhn-Tucker condiEions are
o/F($-")e(")dn - S > o as tr(i) < o, (2.2)
equality if h(0) < 0. For the newcomer Ehe criterion is
that the marginal benefit of additional search must be
at least as great as Ehe exEra search cosE, given that
Ehe reservation price is less than marginal ucility. In
concrast, the old customer is moEivated to search only
if the expecEed difference in cosE is less Ehan Ehe
price change in his current store. Substituting (2.1)
into (2.2) the opEimal reservacion Price turns ou! Eo
be
0=x h(0) < 0, equalicy if h($)< 0. (2.3)
We call 0 the reservation price variability if
t' = f<. For any u 
= 
&, there is no further searchl the
cuscomer remains loyal for one tnore period. Clearly' it
is in rhe incerest of a firm to qanage its Price policy
such tha!, ceteris 
.E!8, u i3 as small as possiblein order to minimize the loss of customers.
Since individuals and their reservation Prl.ces dif-
fer, the denand facing a particular firn is based on a
distribuEion on p and u of old cusEomers and Potential
neecomers. Arbitrarily associaEing one unit of the good
\rith each person the Potential demand for a firmrs com-
modity x arises from a trt-variafe density function
dx,p,u) which is assuned to be identically and inde-pendently distributed over time. Dealing with continu-
oua time r{re let u = dp/dt. The f irm sets price p a! a
rate u. The quancity demanded by cuscomets whoge. reser-
vation price and varisnce are at least equal to $ and
0, respe"tirrely, is Ehe conditional density A(xlC,C).
Expecred deoand is D(p,u) = E(xlp,u) = /Xxq(xlp,u)dx.
For a cos! function C(x), with properties,
c(0)>o,c'>0,c">o
expected profic is
v = n(v*) = /xtxn - c(x)lcp(xlp,u)dx ,
(2.A)
(2.4)
*
where V is actual profit.
It is assuDed that the density g is nornal and Ehat
C ls at ooat a polynonial of second order in x. Thue,
the highest terlr in EtC(x)l is C"var(xlp,u). Sinqe in
lhis case the valiance is independent of p snd ur, the
partials Co and C, reduce to the cerEaincy equivaLents
C'D1 and C'D2, respectively.
Aa is the conventl.on, ne assume further Ehet ex-
pecced oarginal revenue MR(x) and demand D(p,u) are
downward sloping, convetr to the origin, and flnltetDt( 0, 0=D1t <zD;/D, rnf D(p,u) = 0 (2.8)
^ Pru
D2a0,o?0,D22.O (2. c)
The sign assumption on D2 ls a generallzalion. It covers
abgoluce price sensitivity of Ehose who prefer price
stability per se. We finally aeaume chat Price is at
leasc equal to the conpetitive price p > Ct, and that
the nonopoly plice, equating expected narginal revenue
and cosE occurs aE a positlve outPut such that P>C'(o).III. TITE FIRM. S OETIMAL CONTROL POLICY
ttre qptioun feasible Price Path naximizes the
ar1;ceo&ury1 ' f Ee t- Co''i' r^ Cp'n ' r L&'-'l>",< tz/72
OpTIl,tAL PRICE ADJUSTMENT: TESTS OF A PRICE EOUATION IN U.S. MANIIFACTIIRING
Peter von zur Muehlen
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I. S1JMMARY
The following description anci analysis of a firm j'n
alomistic comPetiEion is motivaled by the need lo spec-
ify a dynamic equaEion of price behavior ro be Eested on
U.S. rnanufacfuring time-series data. IE will be shown
that uncertainty of price informacion in a market com-
posed of many competing firns leads to a model which is
roaa o, less in Ehe Evans Eradition of dynamic monopoly
theory.3
itt" t"y dynamic elemenr is che firmrs reaction to
cuslomer behavior in an uncerEain price siEuation' Price
uncertainty forces neercomers to the marke! to search for
an acceptalle price which is less than the marginal
uriliEy of the good. Old cusgomers may decide Eo search
after a price increase, if the exPected difference in
search costs and price is less than the recently experi-
enced price change.
The implications of Ehe theory are examined using a
phase diagram analysis. Of particular interesc for em-
pirical sludy are the effects of change's in model para-
meEers on Ehe time Path of che oPtinal Price control
equaEion. In line wiEh Ehe conclusions of the theoreti-
cal model the estimacion resulEs seem to suggest Ehat
price adjusts Eo a moving equilibrium Palh in a variable
*"rrtua determined by cyclical factorg in the economy'
II. TI{E DYNAI,iICS OF MARKET DEMAND
e centiJ facr mocivating the dynamics of che
model is the exlstence of uncertainty and the cosr of
information. In order to deEermine che most favorable
price a Prospeccive buyer musE canvass the markeE'
ihe probabillty of ending up with lhe lowest Price
offer increases wich the amounc of search' Since search
costs increase with efforE, lhe buyer musE deiermine
how long he should search before making a decision'
The deciease in the expected nininum price is a de-
creasing funcEion of additional search, given any
distribution func!lon of Price quota!ions' lf the
cost of search is increasing or consEant, Ehere is
a unique reserva!ion price which a buyer will ac-
cep C.
Buyers who are accuscomed Eo making Eheir purchases
at one iarticular firo nay have a differen! preference
set Ehan new custoEers searching for good deals' But
sufftcient increases in Price can cauae theo co lose
their loyalty and engage in search which oay now have
become profitable. If lhe firn is aware of this iE has
an incentive co vary price less than if buyers were in-
sensitive Eo Price.
Market slarch is'deteruined as follows' Given his
preferences and a subJective Price dlstribution' lhe in-
iivldual engages in a Process of random sampling untll a
price no hi.gher than his reservacion Price is offered'
unless, of course, he has already bought the Product
Eooewhere and !s satisfted with the price. The reserva-
tlon price is deternined as thaE price which minimizes
che expected cost of the good, including seerch cosca'
It algo has the ProPelty of leaving the peraon at least
as well off ag hc is not buying ac all or paying che old
Drice.
' Stlgler8 and McCa116 nodeled narket search models
for newcooers or for durable goods. Ilere the analysis is
broadened !o cover repeated purchases. We associate a
oargi,n8l utllity I with a unit of rhe coornodity' The
eubjective Probsbiltty denslty function on prices charg-
ed in the i;duEtry is g(n). The cost per search is S'
It ts due to lost wages' leisure gioe' EransPortation
costq and the like. For the density g(n) the probability
of receiving an offer p is^/Pg(n)dn which we denote by
l/N(p). The expected nur"beY of searches required to find
such'an offer 13 thus N(p). To decerrnine hi8 reservation
price $ the individual oininlzes the exPected Price
f(p) =o/P ng(n)dn plus search costs after N(p) searches'
subjecE !o one of Ewo possible restricEions, If he is a
newcomer we require chat y > p. If he is already in the
narkeE he will not want to search' as long as he is
sacisfied wiEh Ehe price he is or has been paying. llow-
ever, assuming his subjective density to be stationary
over Eime, he may decide to search if his price has
risen by u = p1 - p6, where po and pl are the old and
che nelr price, resPectively. Given that Po was previous-
ly deEermined in an oPtimal manner' he will search only
ifu>p-po.Wethushave
nin N(p)[n(p) + s] = K(p,e(n),s) (2.I)
P
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\integral of the discounced instantaneous cash-f1ow
funcEion V(p,u,t). By feasibility we mean p sacisfies
the differentiaL equation
dpidt=p=",p(o)=po=o,p>0, (3'1)
where u is piece-wi.se continuous but oEherwise unres-
rricEed. The Hamiltonian
. -a (t)H(p,u,).,E) = e -'-'(V +l.u) (3.2)
is piece-wise <iifferenriable in (p,u), and tr (t) is a
piece-wise differenciable, non-negative funcEion of
rime such Ehat (p",u^) maximizes
E = u(p,u,r,r) + \p(i/. - r(t)) Q.4)
at each moment of time t, where r(t) = (d/dt)O(t), and
lin e-5(t)f(.) = o.
t+@
If V, and therefore H, is concave in P, sufficiency of
the conditions below is assured. See Arrowz, Kamien and
Schwartz4, Mangasatian5 and MirrleesT. Diff"."ntiating
H with respect to p and u,the firsE-order conditions are
Hr{p*,,r*,1 ,t) +i =}.r(E)
-vz = I'
equation musE alwavs be saci.sfied. it musr hold along
statj.onary pachs. The curve \ = 0 is then Ehe locus ofpoints (u,p) for which
'r', + rV" = g. (3.7)LZ
IE is the oprimal staEionary pach if it sarisfies (3.A),
hence leads to p-. The slope of this curve is
du/dp1, 
=0 = -(u11 * rV12)/(vI2 + rVr2) (3.8)
The sign of this derivative is clearly of importance to
uniqueness and stabiliEy of stationary points, The
1 = 0 curve defines a set of tangencies between_the
markeE race and a set of isoprofit lines V(p,u,t) -
consEanE, where i is a parEicular moment in time,
r = -(V,/Vr) = auidplv=.on"r t 0 p? p. . (3.9)
Along the stacionary i=o4il"-i;.tu slope of an isoprofic
"rrrru 
*,.r"c equal Ehe market-iE6 of inEerest. Clearly,
if r, Vl or V2 change, Ehe points of tangencies change,
hence tFe curve changes position implying different
adjustment rates and/or differenc equilibriurn. The other
equation of relevance in this phase diagram is the
horizontal axis p - u = 0. Two questions must be an-
swered. (1) Is there an optirnal stationary path which
is stable? (2) Is such a path unique?
Figure I.
To answer the first quescion we approximate the
Euler equecion co firsc order near the monopoly price
pm aC some particular time ?.
'p-ri,-"p + apr-V, (pr, o,;) - rv2 (pm, o,f) = 0 , (3. 10)
-1
where a = V22$g + rV12). Since V1= Vt= 0 in equili-
brium, Ehe last two teims drop out. If a > 0, the roots
are real (r is real), have opposite signs and are cen-
tered on r. Hence, p6 is a saddlepoint at T. Clearly,
a > 0 if Vll + rV12 < 0 holds for all values of (u,p).
If H is concave with respect to p (1111 = Vll < 0) the
saddlepoint condition is satisfied whenevei-V.,, is non-
positive or is small, if 1t is^positive. Nore'ihat,
f irsr of all v22=(p-C')D2fC'Di <0 by (2.5). In addirion
V1l<0 if D11(p-D/D1-c') + Dr(2 + DD11/Df - C'b1) < 0.
The second Eerm is negative by assurnption. The first
lera can be positive if p is much higher than the price
at which marginal revenue equals marginal cosE. If D2> 0
whenever p > pm such a situation will noc prevail be-
cause i! would then be in rhe firnrs inEerest to reduce
price as quickly as possible. If. D2< 0 in all cases, we
muat assume that demand is so elastlc Ehac p will never
profitably exceed Pin by very much. This would be the
normal economic situation. The sign of V12 depends on
the signs of Dy2 and D2. Dlffereotiating V2 nith respect
to p we have
VL2 = Dz + (p - 6')D12 - c'DtD2 (3. 11)
By previous assumpCions thls expression is non-positive
if D2 and D12 are non-posicive. If demand does not be-
come less sensitive to price increases at higher prices,
D12 < 0. Slnce this is a fairly reasonable assumption,
Ehe second term is nonposi.tive. Thus, V12 is clearly
negaEive if D2 < 0 as in the case of pure variance
(3. B)
(3. c)
EquaEions (3.1)-(3.C) and che assumptions Iisted in
the preceding section make up the basic strucEure of a
price-setting firrn in atomisEic comPetition. The aim in
this section is co esEablish H-maximizing paEterns of
behavior in (u,p) space sarisfying (3.1) and (3.8).
Within that seE we are interested in those Erajectories
that lead to equilibrium. Thus, che stationary paEhs of(3.1) and (3.B) are singled out for analysis. Optimal
sEationary paEhs i.n Eurn are those that resulE by in-
voking rhe Eransversalicy condition (3.A). At poincs of
inEersection the system is in equilibrium. The task is
to determine if there is a multiPlicity of such PoinEs
and which ones, if any, exhibit some form of stability.
Finally, the investigation qrill turn on the behavior of
the syscem if it is subjected lo exogenous shocks from
outside. The conclusions of that lasr analysis will be
of imporcance in speci.fying and interPreting the em-
pirical example.
From (3.C) we note thac \(t) is a shadow price
equal to the cos! of changing price. Condicion (3.B) is
in fact a marginal condicion equating the Present con-
Erol cost wiEh a discounted stream of future benefits
from the new price level.
r(r) = /r"-6(E-")urds > o, (3.5)
where V1 = o1(P + D/Dl - c') by the assumPtions of
Seccion II. The firstJorder conditions and the trans-
versality condilion thus lead us to a very faroiliar
economic criterion for choice: make a change if all the
benefits, presenc and future, are ac least as large as
the costs of insEituting the change. The augBented
HamilEonian F can be igterpreced as the current expected
profit plus the gains trp from a given price level less
inceres! payments \rp.
Combining (3.8) and (3.C) the firsc-order condi-
tions produce the Euler equation relacing Ehe rate of
change of the imputed concrol value to lhe long-run
pay-off
vl = Dr(p + D/Dl - c') = -(r(t) + v2lv2)v2 (3.6)
This expression reveals lhe non-oPtimality of always
charging the static monopoly Price in this kind of
model. The first term is narginal profiE (with resPect
to pri.ce) which is ordinarily equal to zero aE Ehe
optimum. The monopoly Price Pm is given when marginal
revenue = marginal cost inside the first Pafenthesis.
Thls can clearly only be true when we have V2= V2= O,ot
in the exceptional case when lhe Percenlage rate of
change of the shadow price equals the inceresE rate.
The behavior of the syscem is illustrared in (u,p)
space using the phase diagram Figure 1. Since the Euler
27
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aversion. We note therefore fhat the very assumPEion
which mighc cause positivicy of V11 must unequivocally
imply a neqative Vl2. This offsetting effect of the
two alEernaEive assumDcions may be sufficient Eo imply
positivity oi the coerficienr a in al1 cases, as mus!
be assumed if we are !o have a saddlepoinE equilibrium.
The answer to the second question raised above is
partiallv implied by che preceding analysis. Uultiple
stat.ionary points can occur only if Ehe l. = 0 curve
changes direction somewhere in (u,p) space, ie., if
du/apij=0 changes si"gn. As shown in Fig. 1 this curve
nust have a negative slope near a stable equilibrium,
if price is to drop whenever p > p. and to rise when-
ever p < p6. The saddlepoint assumption means that the
numerator of (3.8) is non-positiys. This condition must
be strengthened to negaciviEy. Similarly, the denomina-
lor must be negative. Since V22 is negative we merely
require thac V12 be negative or small in absolute value.
By differenciating the Euler equation which is a
function of ri,u and p a stationary Euler path u = 0 is
determined. Its slope
du/dnl;_o = -(vrr + rvrr) /(rvr, + 2vrr) (3. L2)
is smaller than that of the \ = 0 curve if V12 < 0, as
shown in Fig. ]. The oprimal stationary paEh chus cuLs
the stalionary u = 0 curve from below, and the arrows
indicate the direction of motion in (u,p) space.
The preceding discussion points Eo Ehe general be-
havioral phenomenon Ehat, if price is anWhell llt,:t-- p(E) F pequilibriurn, rhere exist forces which wiLl reEurn iE to
equilibrium. Indeed, the amounE of adjustment depends
on how far away from equilibrium price happens to be. where w(t)
The rate of adjustment of price is thus Ehe distribuced
and the long-term lrajecEory is a convoluEion of Past
and future stalionary mark-ups apr(t):
T + 
- -1. ,' I (t-s)p"(E) = (\' - \ ) -t0/ e' '- -'apr1s)ds
(4.4)
An optimal control law in lhe present sense is one in
which the firm adjusts co equilibriun by taking into
consideraEion the entire planning horizon, discounting
fucure stationary points eriEh a positive root and
lreighting past mark-up points using the negacive root.
If time c is large, ie., the firm is on a so-called
curnpike, the Eransitory part in (4.2) becomes unim-
portanE (after a sufficient time initial condilions
cease to matter) and the solution simplifies co
,c
"(r) = t' w(r-s)F(s)as
0
is the weight pattern
w(t) = -^ - r (r)elag
i =F(P,- P), F(o) =0, F' > o
As shown by TinsleyLo a solution
transversality condilions. ie. . a
timal for the approximace problem
T- L,p(r) = p'(c) + p"(E)
where the Eransienc comPonenc is
pT(.) = e) E(Po - pl(o)),
satisfying initial and
solution which is op-
cons ists of Er^7o Parts
(4.2)
(4.3)
(4. s)
(4.6)
lag function
(4.7)
(3.13)
where the last two properties follow from the assumP-
!ions underlying the phase diagram.
We now Eurn !o Ehe matEer of the dependence of
adjustment F and equilibrium p* on time. Markets and
technology are undergoing conEinual change. This fact
is reflected in some of the parameEers of the model,
for instance the market rate r(t), Ehe cost function C
and its derivatives, and the demand parameters Di and
Dr,. A change in Ehe inlerest rate r will not affect
e!di1iU.i,r*, since vl = 0 is noc a function of r. How-
ever, whenever r increases, the iso-profit lines must
become steeper. The change i.n the slope of the equili-
brium curve i = 0 depends on the sign of VlZ. Lf.
Vl2 t 0, rhe adjustment P = u(P) to equiliSiium is re-
tiiaea, but if V12 < 0, F' increases if lvl2l is large.
An increase-in marginal cosl or in the demand
elasEicity increases equilibrium price. The rate of
adjuscment is chereby also increased. FinaLly, the cosE
of adjuscment V, plays an important roLe in how quickly
the firm can adipt to changing conditions. If we con-
sider an increase in lo22i, hence ot lv22l, due to a
rise in the aversion Eo price changes, we find that
the slope of the )r = 0 curve is raised. Thus, even as
equilibrium price remains the same, adjustmen! to that
point is acceleraEed if price-change sensilivily in-
creases.
IV. APPROXII'IATION OF THE OPTIMAL PATI{
We take as starting point the linear exPansion(3.11) wich ap.(t) serving as a forcing funccion of
the approximaEii opcimal control law. Thus, although
che Euler equation in_(3.11) applies strictly speaking
Eo a particular tiloe E, we now assume Ehaf the exPan-
sion path is a function of time, but, to be truthful,
only in a limited nanner. Any changes in r and a w111'
for the moment, be conveniently ignored, only to be re-
sullected laEer on, where such changes will be taken
care of in a somewhat more ad hoc manner.
The roots of (3.10) have the symmetry ProPerty
-+-rI +tr'=r l. <0<r<tr' (4. 1)
and i'(r) is the target of the discributed(4.5) 
,
F<tl = -(r-)-l 7-utr*{t-")"or(s)ds
c
A heuristic interpletation of the Earget F(t) can
be based on an argument of quasi-nryopic behavior. If
the firm were completely myopic it would consider only
the presenE value of apm(t). In quasi-nyopic optimiza-
tion the firm takes the mark-up values currenc a! each
point of tigle and forms a convoluted target as the for-
ward lead shown in (4.7).
The correspondence betereen che analysis in this
section and the phase-diagram becomes evident if we
differentiate (4.5) wi.!h Tespect Eo time
i<tl = -r-tF(t) - p(E)l = F(F(t) - p(t)). (4.8)
Clearly, as before the adjustnen! propertiee F(0) = 0
and Fr > 0 are preserved. We notice also thac the
value to which price adjusts in phase space is no
longer the simplified sEa!ionary monopoly mark-uP ap-
but the convolution shown in (4.7). lt we notr considiir
the effects of changing inEeresc rates and changing
selsitiviEy to price-variance, ne find that adjustmenc
-). and the target must be revised. The roots of(3.10), our approximate Euler equacion, are determined
by che discount rate r(t) and by the coefficient g
wtrich is a function of model parameters embodied in V.
A quick check nich (3.10) confirms the result of the
phase diagram analysis for the general model, ie.,
d-I-/ar ? o, a-r /aa > o (4.9)
As {n Sectlon III, the conclusLon is that an increaEe
in the rate of dlscoun! tends !o speed up adjustnent
if Vlr is negative and large in absolute value, while
an ifiErease in a, brought about by lncreased costs,
decreased demand elasticity, or an increased sensiclv-
ity co price variation, will accelerate adjustEent.
The siroilarity of equation (4.8) !o others that
have been proposed as enpirical hypotheses for price
28
\adjuslment is deceprive. As noced, F(t) is not a cur-
rent Eerm but. embodies all Ehe informaEion, Past and
future, which the firm has available concerning ics
cosc and demand slruclure. Even the adiustment rate
which ordinarily is a consEanE is now deEerrnined by
condicions affeccing coscs and opPortunities of the
firrn. Given a changing environmenE, optimal behavior by
the firm will imply concinual revision of the adjust-
ment process. The task of the nexE seclion will be to
find a suitable nay of exPresslng this phenomenon for
empirical est imation.
Finally, in real-world applications decisions and
measurements are di-screte. The discrete aPProximation
of the continous control equaEion (4.8) is
t
p(r) =\ E(1-r)!'it-i) 0<r, =-\-/(1-r-) < 1. (4.10)
0
These weights are obtained by considering lhe time
deri.vative of p in (4.8) as the limit
1im p(r) - p(r-h) 
= -r /(l_h r-)tF(r)-p(r_h)1h+0 h
If, however, we lel h = 1, lhe result in (4.10) is ob-
tained. The normalizati-on of h = I will thus be assumed
for quarEerly data.
V. SPECITICATION OF A PRICE EOUATION
If rhe Production funcEion is Iinear homogeneous,
the stationary monopoly Price is given by
p = "lc'(x) = Tl [o/n]k, (5. i)
'm
where 1 = e/L+e is the scaEic rnonopoly mark-up, e Ehe
demand elasticily pDl/x, o Ehe ltage ra!e' n lhe Price
of materials, and k < I che elasticity of oucpuc with
respecE E6 labor input. I is a convolution of forward
equilibrium prices Pm(t). l.Ie assume-the exPonencial +
forecasting ruie etpr(s) I tl = ev(s-E)p*(c). LeE v * \ ,
integrate (4.7) and i'ubstituce the result and (5.1) in-
co (4.10)
p(r) = i 
""t-ttr)[o(r-i)/n(t-i)]k,(t-i)0 (5.2)
effect EransmiEted due to a change in 6 or n in period
t. Because of comon time trends leading to collinear-
iEy problems, rre use only 2-period moving averages of
Z placeo in allelnaEing periods. Assuraing a 1ag of
three periods, the weighc schedule has the staggered
form
wrlo; =h(o) +m(o,o)az.
wElt;=h(1)+m(o,r)AZ.
wElz; = h(2) + m(0,2)az. + n(2,o)Lzr*,
wc(:) = h(3) + m(0,3)az. + m(2,\)Lz*Z
(s.4)
where m(2,0) = -m(2,1) by the zero-sum restriccion. The
effect in period 3 of a change in c(c) is thus h(3)' a
constanE, plus a constant proPortion of the change in
Zg, plus a furEher porcion caused by AZ two Periodg
hence. Clearly, as the time paEh of Z varies, so doeE
the profile of lhe adjustment Pattern.
The weights h(i) and m(i) were estimated using an
orchogonal power series aPProximation v(i) = b6 + b1i
+...+ fui'. rr The besE fitting combination of n andd
was raken as lhe preferred outcome. The results are
shown in Tables I and 2. In part I of the tables the
weight schedules
w(i)x-i = [h(i) + m(0,i)Az-. + n(2,i'-2)Lz-rlx-,
are denoted by the polynomial
Pv,(X) = Ph(X) + PO_:(x) + P2-3(X) + ....
The firsE term indicates the fixed portion of the
schedule. P,-. indicates the peri,ods (from i to j) in
which z(i-jl dodifies the variable portion of ll. Part
I of each table gives the t-values of the polynomial
coefficients for each of the fixed and variable weight
schedules used to construct W(i) in Parc II. Bars over
m and h mean they perEain to distribuEed weights on n.(See 5.3). Theorecically, the barred and unbarred
weights should be idencical, after dividiug by k, but
qrere noE so restricEed. The second Part in each of the
tables is (5.4) transposed.,,
The quarterly data arer"
p: BLS manufacturing vholesale price index
n: An index of materials prices
o: CompensaEion per manhour in U.S. manufacEuring
r: CorporaEe bond rate (Moody Aaa)
U: RaEio of unfilled orders Eo capaciey ouEput (real
sales less changes in finished goods inventories
divided by Ehe Wharton rate of capaciEy utilization)
The variable influence on Ehe adjustment Profile
of price to changes in coscs exerted by U and r is
quite evident. As hypoEhesized, increases in the raEio
of unfilled orders to capacity outpuE accelerate che
distributed response. The same is true of the discount
rate, but to a somewhat lesser exEent. This result does
not contradict a possible hypoChesis that D12 is nega-
tive, as suggested in SecEions III and IV.
Table 1
I. Interpolation Coefflcients Z = U
Polynonial Degree
R2 = .99
SE = .0027
Dw = 2.11
Intercept=
-.006
Span 54II-
67tV
b; bt bz b3
ii[#1"'
Pg-3 (srln)
16-3 (n)
m(2,0) a
;(2, o)
J
3
2
2
11. I l.0l
5.34
3.23
2.59
2.02
I 86
l. 65
3. 85
1. 73
1. 56
1. 06
3. 06
*r- i
where w - -(i) = Tla(t)(r-I(t))(r-r (l))il(f+(t)-.r).
Expanding- (5.2) fog-linearly about the saople mean
E = G6')tf, subtracting ln n(t) and differencing we
obtain a distribured-lag funccion in logarithmic dif-
f"r"n"es 12
tr r- I
Aln(pin) = b+k ! !I' '(i)Aln(orn)r-,
0
n
* i il'-i(ilaln *.-i (s.3)
0
where
wt-i(i) = 
""t-i1i)/l "*c-tqi), ana F(i) = t.l(i),
i-=L,2,..,,ni = w(i)-1, i=0. b is a consEant, if the
rernainder of che expansion is a linear polynomial of
tiEe. The uni!-sulu resErlction assumed to apply to the
w*1i.) also holds for che I.l(i). Following Ehe discussion
in IV, we single out r(t) and a variable affecEing V22
as altering the adjusEroent profile. The racio of unfil-
led orders to caPacity U rePresents demand Pressures
that have no more than transitory effects on price be-
havior. According to thg theory both variables should
acceleraEe adjustment. " Tf Z stands for eilher r or U,
the hypothesis willobe Eested thaE Z modifies the weight
schedule as follows'
ii
Ht(i) = h(i) + x m(i, L- i)zr+i, I ro( j, i-i) = 0,
o 'J 0
vhere Wt(L) is Ehe i-th Period Portion of the total
29
*b 
= 0 for zero sum testriction.
\n(r)
lr 1i 1b
m(0, i)lU
ff(0, i)au
m(2,i-2)AU+2
E(2, i-2)AU+2
l,I(i)c
.8234=k
.0
.0
.0
.0
,0
i.0
Table 1 concd.
II. Normaiized tr^leighc Schedule (4U = Sl Mil.) i (1,
I
140
r-00
50
i3
r(i)=100rw(j)/rw(j)
oo
t $Mil L t+2(a) 48I ! Au = (-.6, -.2)(b) s7I : AU = (-.3, -.6)(c) 66Iv: AU = ( .2, -.2)(d) 50Iv: AU = (1.2, r.3)
Figure 2.
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-. 5587
. 5527
.5081
.2209
.2407
.0215
.0448
.2467
.0549
.0909
-.287r
-.2765
- .2858
-.2332
- .5062
2 336
227 I
!442-
185 8
2858
2332
3253.934r
a. m(2,0) is coefficienc of 4lnIo/nLZ*Z]-2.
b. See definiEion
c. w(i) = h(i)/k
sum applied to
s inilar.
or w rn (). J,l .
t
+ i m(j,i) Eo give w in (5.3). The ilj=o
Ehe distributed lag on rr is very
Table
ion Co
2
ff ic ie
See noEe Eo Table 1.
a, b, c, see noces to Table l.
Four cumulative discributions using data from past
periods are shown in Fig. 2. The iniEially large res-
ponse of curve (d) lllustraces the empirical conclusion
of this paper in a rather dramatic way.
VI. CONCLUSION
The following points deserve emphasis. (f) If the
results are ac least qualitatively valid, the variable-
weight schedules seem Eo indtcate Eha!, as in che
phaae-space analysis, lhe Dovlng equilibrium path and
adJustnent to it are reguLated by the economic features
of the model. (2) A fairly scrong case can be made for
the claim Ehat price adjusEnenE patterns are cyclical
to che exten! that unfilled orders behave cycIically.
Thls should be of particular significance to policy
makers trying to control inflation. (3) Thls model has
excluded the interdependence of other declsions of Ehe
firn. The inceraccion of dynanic adjustoents, ie.,
additional consideration as staEe and conttol variables
of oulput, factor inputs, unfllled orders, and inven-
Eories has not been represenEed in thls paper.
| (d)
nt
Polynomial Degree C-rat ios
R2 = .985
SE = .0029
DI,I = 2.13
In !erc ep t =
-. 0057
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.59 1ao
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II. Nornalized l{eight Schedule (Ar = .01)
h(i).
E(i)o
m(0,2)Ar
fr(O, i)ar
m(2, i-2)[r-a
fr(2, i-z)ar-i
I.I(i)c
.3341
-.5464
.2552
.3062
.6682
1340
128 I
0078
0233
r735
LO22
13 93
L237
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2539
.?790
-. 1393
-. 1881
.25L5
.233L
- 
4072
8623 .8089=
.0
.0
.0
.U
.0
1.0
30
